In this paper, I examine the impacts of trade and investment liberalization on the wage structure of Mexico. Part one of the paper surveys recent literature on the labor-market consequences of Mexico's economic reforms in the 1980?s. Mexico's policy reforms appear to have raised the demand for skill in the country, reduced rents in industries that prior to reform paid their workers high wages, and raised the premium paid to workers in states along the U.S. border. These changes have resulted in an increase in wage dispersion in the country. Part two of the paper examines changes in Mexico's wage structure during the 1990's. In the last decade, Mexico has experienced rising returns to skill, which mirror closely wage movements in the United States. There is, however, little evidence of wage convergence between the two countries. Regional wage differentials in Mexico have widened and appear to be explained largely by variation in regional access to foreign trade and investment and in regional opportunities for migration to the United States. I discuss implications of Mexico's experience for the rest of Latin America in the event a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas is enacted.
INTRODUCTION
The proposed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) would alter dramatically trading relationships in the Western Hemisphere. Eliminating trade barriers within the region would, among other effects, induce economies to specialize more in export production. Such specialization would enable countries in Latin America to realize gains from trade, but these income gains would likely not be shared equally by all individuals in society. In Brazil, for instance, farmers growing oranges or workers producing shoes would likely benefit more from an FTAA than would capital-intensive manufacturers. As a result, an FTAA would be likely to redistribute national incomes in the region. Latin America's long history of income inequality makes the impact of an FTAA on the distribution of earnings an important issue for policymakers.
In this paper, I use Mexico as a test case for how regional free trade affects labor earnings. I examine how trade reform in Mexico, and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in particular, has altered the country's wage structure. Mexico is a useful case to study because it has opened itself to trade aggressively. It unilaterally liberalized foreign trade and investment policies in the 1980's and then enacted NAFTA in 1994, which further reduced trade barriers and helped lock in reform by enshrining it in a multilateral treaty. Mexico is now as closely tied to the North American economy as at any point in its history. In 2000, it sent 88.7% of its exports to and bought 73.1% of its imports from the United States. Greater openness has helped increase the share of trade in Mexico's GDP from 11.2% in 1980 to 32.2% in 2000.
There are several channels through which North American economic integration impacts Mexico's labor market. One is by equalizing the price of traded goods between economies. Trade theory predicts that convergence in goods' prices between countries creates pressure for convergence in factor prices. In Mexico, this would affect both wage levels and the relative wages of low-and high-skilled labor. An additional channel through which trade reform may shock labor demand is through its impact on capital flows. Given that capital appears to complement skilled labor, capital inflows may increase the demand for skill. In Mexico, NAFTA appears to have raised capital inflows in part by raising investor confidence in the country's commitment to free trade. In using Mexico to preview the effects of an FTAA, it is important to recognize that it differs from the rest of Latin America in some important respects. In particular, Mexico shares a land border with the United States that creates opportunities for migration abroad that other countries do not enjoy. During the 1990's, net immigration from Mexico in the United States was about 400,000 individuals per year. In the absence of migration flows, trade reform in Mexico might have generated even more trade and FDI than has occurred. Any estimate of the impact of regional free trade on Mexico, then, may understate the impact an FTAA would have on the rest of the region.
The body of the paper has two parts. In part one, I examine changes in Mexico's wage structure following reforms in the 1980's. Here, I rely on a substantial body of research that examines the impact of specific policy changes on labor earnings. This work finds that lower barriers to foreign trade and investment have changed Mexico's wage structure. The evidence suggests that tariff reductions have increased relative wages for skilled workers, increased foreign investment has raised the relative demand for skilled labor, and tariff and quota reductions have altered inter-industry wage differentials. Mexico's economic opening thus appears to have raised the skill premium and reduced industry rents going to labor. It also appears to have increased wages in states along the U.S. border relative to the rest of the country.
In part two of the paper, I use data from the 1990 and 2000 Mexico population census to examine changes in Mexican wages over the period during which NAFTA was implemented. During the 1990's in Mexico, the returns to skill continued to rise and regional differences in wages continued to widen. Wage gains were largest in regions most exposed to international trade, FDI, and/or opportunities for migration to the United States. After controlling for regional exposure to globalization, other regional characteristics appear to be unimportant in explaining wage changes. Overall, wage gains were largest for more-educated workers living close to the United States and smallest for less-educated workers living in the country's south. There is little evidence of convergence in wages between Mexico and the United States. I conclude the paper by discussing the implications of these results for an FTAA.
POLICY CHANGE AND WAGES IN MEXICO: THE FIRST REFORM WAVE
The last two decades in Mexico have not been a quiet period. Since 1980, the country has had three currency crises, bouts of high inflation, and severe macroeconomic contractions. The reform of the country's trade and investment policies has been, in part, a response to this turmoil. Following a balance of payments crisis in 1982, the country eased restrictions on maquiladoras. In 1985, Mexico joined the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), which entailed cutting tariffs and eliminating many non-tariff barriers. In 1989, Mexico eased restrictions on the rights of foreigners to own assets in the country. In 1994, NAFTA consolidated and extended these reforms and tied them to reciprocal access to the U.S. and Canadian markets. Concomitant with its economic opening, Mexico privatized state-owned enterprises, deregulated entry restrictions in many industries, and used wage and price restraints to combat inflation.
The policy shocks to Mexico's labor markets have attracted much academic attention. A large body of work examines the impact that these policy changes have had on wages in the country. In this section, I briefly survey the literature. I organize the discussion around three questions: (i) Why have skill premia in Mexico risen? (ii) Has greater economic openness affected regional wage differences in Mexico? And, (iii) is there evidence of labor-market integration between Mexico and the United States?
Rising Skill Premia in Mexico
Relative to the United States, Mexico has abundant supplies of less-skilled labor and scarce supplies of human and physical capital. Trade and investment reforms would be likely to alter the relative demand for labor of different types, producing changes in the premium for skill. Recent research shows that Mexico has indeed experienced changes in the relative wages of skilled workers, but ones that are quite different from what many would have expected given Mexico's relative factor supplies.
Since the mid 1980's, Mexico has experienced widening wage inequality associated with rising returns to skill. Cragg and Epelbaum (1996) show that between 1987 and 1993, though average real wages rose by 30%, the wages of urban workers with a primary education (grade six completed) fell relative to the wages of urban workers with secondary education (completed grade nine) by 15% and relative to the wages of urban workers with post-secondary education by 60%. The returns to labor-market experience also rose markedly over this time period. Skill premia continued to rise in the 1990's. Robertson (2001) finds that the annual return to schooling for urban workers rose from 0.035 in 1987 to 0.05 in 1994 and to 0.07 in 1998. Consistent with evidence that skill premia and average educational attainment among workers have increased simultaneously, Cragg and Epelbaum (1995) suggest that Mexico's rising skill premium is due mostly to increases in the relative demand for skill.
Why has the relative demand for skilled labor in Mexico risen? The literature proposes a several answers to this question. The one that has attracted the most attention is that rising skill premia are due to trade and investment liberalization. Attributing rising skill premia to trade reform may seem counterintuitive, given Mexico's presumed comparative advantage in low-skill activities (Leamer, 1993) . The natural expectation might be that skill premia in Mexico would fall, not rise, after liberalization. collar to blue-collar employment and that the 1984-1990 change in industry tariffs is positively correlated with this employment ratio. This suggests that trade protection was initially higher in less-skill intensive sectors and was reduced by more in these sectors during reform. If these tariff changes were passed through to changes in goods' prices, then the logic of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem (1941) would imply that the relative wage of skilled labor would have risen. Robertson (2001) suggests that this is exactly what happened. He finds that over the period 1987-1993 the relative price of skillintensive goods in Mexico rose and that the tariff-induced change in relative prices had the effect of raising the relative wage for white-collar labor. Interestingly, tariff reductions in Mexico due to NAFTA have been larger in more-skill intensive sectors, suggesting that the final stage of trade reform may halt the increase in skill premia.
In related work, Feliciano (2001) finds that between 1986 and 1990 wage dispersion in Mexico rose more in tradables than in non-tradables. She also finds that trade reform altered inter-interindustry wage differentials. Industry wage premia fell more in industries with larger reductions in import-license requirements, but not in industries with larger reductions in tariffs. Consistent with these results, Revenga (1997) finds that over the period [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] manufacturing plants in industries with larger reductions in tariffs and non-tariff barriers had higher reductions in employment. These findings suggest that industries that enjoyed high rents before trade reform, as indicated by high average wages after controlling for observable worker characteristics, experienced relatively large reductions in wages and employment after trade reform.
Another mechanism through which trade and investment reform may have increased the demand for skilled labor in Mexico is outsourcing to the country by foreign How has the growth of maquiladoras affected labor demand in Mexico ? Feenstra and Hanson (1997) show that in theory if policy reform allows U.S. firms to outsource more production to Mexico, these firms will choose to move the least skill-intensive activities that they perform. By moving low-skill activities to Mexico, the average skill intensity of production would rise in both the United States and Mexico. This would raise the relative demand and earnings of high-skilled workers in both countries, contributing to a binational increase in wage inequality.
To test these predictions, Feenstra and Hanson (1997) Beyond the specific activity of outsourcing, FDI in general is likely to affect the level and structure of wages in Mexico. Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1996) 
Regional Wage Differences in Mexico
Mexico's proximity to the United States suggests that trade liberalization for the country was tantamount to economic integration with its northern neighbor. Given northern Mexico enjoys relatively low-cost access to the U.S. market, we would expect that North American economic integration would raise the demand for labor in the region relative to the rest of the country. Hanson (1996 Hanson ( , 1997 border (Hanson 1997) . In 1993, after eights years of reform, the share of manufacturing activity in Mexico City had fallen to 29% and the share at the border had risen to 30%.
By 1998, four years after NAFTA, Mexico City's employment share had fallen further to 23% and the border's employment share had risen to 34% (Chiquiar 2001) .
Movements in regional relative wages also suggest North American economic integration has benefited northern Mexico disproportionately. Hanson (1996) 
Convergence in Mexican and U.S. Wages
Have the flows of goods, capital, and people helped integrate the labor markets of wage is positively correlated with Mexican tariffs and import-license requirements. The estimated regression coefficients for the sample of production workers and for the sample of non-production workers are very similar. A 50% reduction in tariffs would be associated with a 3.7% reduction in relative Mexico-U.S. wages for less-skilled workers and a 4.3% reduction in relative Mexico-U.S. wages for more-skilled workers.
It is tempting to interpret these results to mean that trade liberalization in Mexico depressed wages for Mexican workers relative to their U.S. counterparts. Were this the case, one might the effects on more-and less-skilled workers to be asymmetric, but they are not. An alternative and more plausible interpretation is that trade barriers in Mexico allowed firms to earn rents, which they shared with workers in the form of higher wages.
Trade reform would have reduced these rents, producing a positive correlation between trade protection in Mexico and relative Mexico-U.S. wages for all labor types.
Summary
Recent literature suggests that liberalizing barriers to trade and investment have contributed to changes in Mexico's wage structure. 4 There is evidence consistent with tariff reductions having increased relative wages for skilled workers, increased foreign investment having raised the relative demand for skilled labor, and tariff and quota reductions having altered inter-industry wage differentials. Mexico's economic opening thus appears to have raised the demand for skill and reduced industry rents going to labor.
Both changes appear to have had adverse consequences for low-skilled workers.
Several larger messages also emerge from the literature. One is that Mexico's comparative advantage in low-skill activities is not as strong as many had thought.
Mexico's trade reform entailed larger tariff reductions in less-skill-intensive industries, reflecting the high levels of protection afforded these industries under import-substitution industrialization. After trade reform, less-skill-intensive industries ended up taking the hardest hit in terms of wage and employment declines. This may come as a surprise, There is also evidence that other reforms affected Mexico's labor market. During the 1980's, real minimum wages declined substantially. Bell (1997) finds that this didn't affect formal-sector employment due to low initial minimum wages and non-compliance with minimum wage laws (see Feliciano, 1998 , for evidence of stronger minimum-wage effects). Woodruff (1998) finds that government encouragement of wage restraints to combat inflation in the late 1980's had a larger impact on large firms than on small firms, leading to a disappearance of the employer-size wage effect. Fairris (2002) finds that during the late 1980's and early 1990's the observed increase in wage dispersion in Mexico was larger in the unionized sector (though lower in this sector to begin with), perhaps indicating a decline in union bargaining power.
finished goods like t-shirts, plastic footwear, and simple consumer electronics, it appears to have a cost advantage in assembly services for the U.S. economy. Mexican manufacturing has, in effect, reoriented itself from producing simple consumer goods to being a subcontractor for the North American economy.
A second message to emerge from the literature is that trade and FDI appear to be complements. Trade reform freed up resources in manufacturing that allowed Mexico to become more specialized export assembly. But to make this transition, the country 
Data and Summary Statistics
The data I use for the analysis are 1% random samples from the 1990 and 2000
Mexico population census. Much previous research limits the analysis to the manufacturing sector and/or to workers in large cities and so gives only a partial view of how Mexico's wage structure has evolved. The census provides comprehensive data on earnings and employment in Mexico. By looking over the entire decade of the 1990s, the analysis spans both the planning and negotiation period for NAFTA and the period following its enactment. This helps account for the possibility that firms began adjusting to NAFTA before the treaty was formally approved. It also extends the time period well beyond the severe recession Mexico suffered in 1995, when real GDP fell by 6.2%, which was precipitated by a bungled devaluation of the peso. 
OLS Wage Regressions, 1990 and 2000
To summarize changes in Mexico's wage structure, I present results from OLS wage regressions. Since most regressors in the estimation are dummy variables, these results summarize the conditional mean of log wages with respect to education, region, industry, and other characteristics. This is a compact way to characterize the returns to observable characteristics at different points in time. Tables 3a and 3b In Table 3a , several changes in earnings for males over 1990-2000 are apparent.
First, there is a sharp increase in the returns to high levels of schooling (but not to low or moderate schooling). The returns to completing 13-15 years of schooling (the equivalent of some college) rose by 13.3 log points and the returns to completing 16 or more years of schooling (the equivalent of at least a college education) rose by 13.1 log points. region rose by 8.5 log points relative to south region, while wages in other regions were stable relative to the south. Fourth, there are changes in inter-industry wage differentials.
Wages in agriculture, the excluded sector, rose relative to all industries except public administration and social assistance. This may reflect the reform of agriculture. With the breakup of ejidos, only relatively high-wage workers may have remained in the sector.
Some results are sensitive to whether or not the self-employed are included in the sample. Excluding the self-employed, wages in all regions except the Yucatan rose relative to the south. The border again showed the largest increase in relative wages. Table 3b shows wage regressions for females. For women, there were increases in returns to education at all levels, with the largest increases occurring at the highest schooling levels. Wages in the south fell relative to wages in all other regions, with the border having the largest wage increases. In contrast to males, females in manufacturing earn relatively low wages. The results for women should be interpreted with caution.
The large increase in female labor-force participation in the 1990's suggests that the composition of females in the labor force may have changed over time. Self-selection into work may introduce bias into the estimation for women.
Summary
Wages changes in the 1990's mirrored those in the 1980's. Returns to schooling appeared to rise, the border wage premium rose, and industry wages shifted in favor of agriculture. While manufacturing employment became more concentrated in the border region, the border's share of the national population increased only slightly.
ECONOMIC OPENNESS AND CHANGES IN MEXICO'S WAGE STRUCTURE
In this section, I examine the role that economic openness has played in Mexico's evolving wage structure. To do so, we need measures of shocks to the economy and to define groups of workers that have similar sensitivities to these shocks. Lacking data on 
Wages Changes for Mexican and U.S. Cohorts
The first exercise is to compare wage changes in Mexico and the United States.
Evidence using high-frequency data in Robertson (2001) suggests that Mexico-U.S. wage convergence is occurring. I revisit the issue using long-period time changes. This requires constructing a matching panel of U.S. synthetic cohorts. To do so, I use the 1990 and 2000 Current Population Survey (for merged outgoing rotation groups). These cohorts are defined for the United States as a whole for the same age and education categories as their Mexican counterparts. One problem with the CPS is that it does not identify country of birth in 1990. U.S. cohorts thus include both immigrant and nativeborn workers. This is unfortunate because during the 1990's large numbers of immigrants with low-education levels arrived in the United States. Immigration changes the underlying population of individuals from which the CPS sample is drawn, with the change being largest for the cohorts with the lowest education levels. The results in Table 4 suggest there has been substantial variation in wage changes across labor-market groups in Mexico. To see this variation more clearly, Table   5 breaks out changes in real CPI Mexico wages and real relative CPI Mexico-U.S. wages for the sample of cohorts by age, education, and region. Real Mexico wages and real Mexico-U.S. wages fall least for younger cohorts. Young women are the only cohort to experience real wage gains both in absolute terms and relative to the United States. From Table 3 , it is not surprising to see that more educated workers have higher wage growth.
Men with 13 or more years of education have positive real wage gains, but only males in the 13-15 years of education cohort have real wages gains relative to the United States.
Women with 12 or more years of education have real absolute and relative wage gains, again with the 13-15 years of education cohort showing the strongest gains.
Turning to regions, we see that on average all regions show real absolute and relative wage declines. These declines are smallest in the border region and largest in the south and the Yucatan. In Table 3 , more educated workers and workers in the border region were among those with the highest wages in 1990. The results in Table 5 I begin by replicating the specification in Robertson (2000) , in which the independent variables are the log difference in lagged Mexico and U.S. wages and the log change in U.S. wages. He allows regression coefficients to differ between border and interior regions, in order to capture possibly stronger links between Mexican and U.S.
labor markets for Mexican regions closer to the United States. Similarly, I interact regressors with a dummy variable for border states. The large coefficient on U.S. wage growth is surprising and invites skepticism.
One concern about the specification in column one is that by forcing the coefficients on 1990 Mexico wages and 1990 U.S. wages to be equal and of opposite sign we are possibly convoluting Mexico-U.S. wage convergence with convergence or divergence in wages across Mexican cohorts. To address this issue, in column two I add the 1990 log Mexico wage, and its interaction with the border dummy, as regressors. It is now the case that the coefficients on the difference in 1990 Mexico-U.S. wages and the border interaction with this variable are statistically insignificant. This is evidence against Mexico-U.S. wage convergence. The coefficient on 1990 Mexico wages is positive and precisely estimated and the border interaction with this variable is negative and precisely estimated. What this suggests is that during the 1990's interior regions had higher wage growth for cohorts with higher initial wages. In other words, there was wage divergence in interior regions, but not in the border region. This evidence of growing wage dispersion is not surprising, given the rising returns to skill evident in Table 3 . Overall, evidence of Mexico-U.S. wage convergence appears to be fragile. This confirms the impression from mean relative wage changes in Table 4 .
In column three, I examine the sensitivity of changes in Mexico wages to changes in U.S. wages by adding dummy variables for three age categories (16-24 years of age is the excluded category) and dummy variables for five education categories (0-4 years of schooling is the excluded category) to the regression. The dummy variables for age are individually and jointly statistically insignificant. After controlling for education and U.S. cohort wage changes, there appear to be no age-specific wage changes in Mexico.
The dummy variables for education are positive and precisely estimated, with larger magnitudes for higher education levels that suggest rising returns to schooling.
With controls for age and education included, the coefficient on U.S. wage changes becomes small and imprecisely estimated. Since U.S. wages vary only by age and education, the only variation left in U.S. wage changes after including age and education dummies are age-specific changes in the returns to education. The results suggest that it is the commonality in overall changes in returns to education that account for the strong positive correlation between Mexico and U.S. wage changes. These results are not evidence against Mexico-U.S. labor market integration. Instead, they imply that the mechanisms that link wages in Mexico and the United States (be they trade, FDI, and/or migration) work through broad changes in the returns to education.
Estimation Results for Regional Exposure to Globalization
In column four of Table 6a Column four of Table 6a reports the results. Wage changes are uncorrelated with the share of state GDP in manufacturing or in agriculture. It appears that industrial specialization (at least measured at this aggregate level) is not associated with changes in regional wage differences. Mexican regions with larger manufacturing sectors do have higher wage levels but did not enjoy higher wage growth in the 1990's.
There are strong positive correlations between wage growth and the share of FDI and between wage growth the share of imports in state GDP. It appears that states with greater exposure to multinational firms and/or with greater exposure to foreign trade enjoyed higher wage growth in the 1990's. This suggests, perhaps not surprisingly, that regions with better access to global markets for goods and capital had larger increases in the demand for labor during the 1990's. The correlation between wage changes and the state share of national maquiladora employment is positive but statistically insignificant.
What this may suggest is that, controlling for FDI inflows (and for state proximity to the United States), there is nothing special about a state having a particular concentration in export assembly operations. What matters is overall access to foreign capital.
There is a strong positive correlation between wage changes and historical state migration rates to the United States. States with better opportunities for migration abroad had higher wage growth during the 1990's. This suggests that migration abroad puts upward pressure on wages in the region from which workers were drawn.
Regional exposure to globalization appears to account for a large portion of regional wage differentials. To see this clearly, compare results in columns three and four of Table 6a . The regression in column three includes controls for age, education, lagged Mexico and U.S. wages, and U.S. wage growth. In this regression coefficients on regional dummy variables are large and statistically significant. When I introduce the globalization measures in column four the magnitudes of these coefficients fall considerably and they become individually and jointly statistically insignificant. The regional characteristics that matter for wage in Mexico during the 1990's appear to be those related to regional exposure to foreign trade, investment, and migration.
The results for females are shown in Table 6b . With a few exceptions, the results for males and females are similar. For females, there remains the concern that changes in allowing for interactions between returns to schooling and either border dummies or distance to the United States, (b) using as the dependent variable changes in Mexico wages minus changes in U.S. wages, and (c) measuring U.S. wages using data on the four U.S. border states only rather than data for the U.S. as a whole.
IMPLICATIONS OF MEXICO'S EXPERIENCE FOR AN FTAA
In this paper, I have surveyed recent literature on the impact of trade and investment liberalization in Mexico on wages in the country and examined recent changes in the country's wage structure. Over the last two decades, Mexico has dramatically opened its economy to the rest of the world. During this period, Mexico has experienced three significant changes in its wage structure: (a) overall wage levels have had large temporary declines, usually following a macroeconomic contraction, (b) wages in states on the Mexico-U.S. border have increased relative to wages in the rest of the country, and (c) there has been a sustained increase in the returns to skill in the country, leading to an overall increase in wage inequality.
The breadth of Mexico's reforms complicates identifying their effects on labor markets in the country. Compounding these problems are the effects of Mexico's recent macroeconomic instability. Nevertheless, a number of important lessons emerge from Mexico's experience for how economic integration with other countries, and in particular with a large, rich neighbor, impacts labor markets in a developing country. These lessons are useful for gauging how an FTAA might affect other Latin American countries.
The liberalization of barriers to foreign trade and investment appears to have contributed to an increase in the relative demand for skill in Mexico. Recent literature suggests that tariff reductions increased relative wages for skilled workers, increased foreign investment raised the relative demand for skilled labor, and tariff and quota reductions altered inter-industry wage differentials. Mexico's economic opening thus appears to have raised the premium paid to skilled workers and reduced rents in industries that prior to reform paid their workers relatively high wages. Both of these outcomes have increased in wage dispersion in the country.
One factor that contributed to how trade affected wages in Mexico was that prior to trade reform, the country had relatively high tariffs on less-skill-intensive industries.
These industries thus bore the brunt of adjustment to Mexico's economic opening.
Similar tariff adjustments following an FTAA are unlikely to be a common occurrence in the rest of Latin America. One reason for this is that many countries have already engaged in some degree of unilateral trade liberalization. Columbia, for instance, reduced its trade barriers in the early 1990s. As in Mexico, trade reform in Columbia led to larger tariff reductions in less-skill-intensive industries (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2001 ).
Thus, the shock of trade reform related to tariff reductions in low-skill industries may have already been delivered in many Latin American countries.
In the 1990's, Mexico consolidated its economic opening by signing and enacting NAFTA. The decade saw further increases in the premium paid to workers in Mexican states on the U.S. border and in the premium paid to more-skilled workers. Following
Mexico's peso crisis of 1994-1995, real wage levels declined both in absolute terms and relative to the United States. Increases in the returns to education during the 1990's in
Mexico were nationwide and appeared to follow closely increases in the returns to education in the United States. Partial labor-market integration between Mexico and the United States is a likely explanation for these cross-border wage co-movements.
Changes in regional wage differentials in Mexico appear to be explained almost entirely by regional variation in exposure to foreign markets. Wage growth has been much stronger in regions with higher levels of FDI, higher levels of exposure to foreign trade, and higher rates of migration to the United States.
Overall, the workers in Mexico that have fared the best in the country's newly Latin America, it may not produce the same degree of regional specialization in export production that NAFTA has generated in Mexico. (1990, 2000) , four 1990 age categories (16-25, 26-35, 36-45, and 46-55 years) , seven education categories (0-4, 5-8, 9-11, 12, 13-15, and 16+ years of schooling), and Mexico's 32 states (U.S. cohorts are defined for the nation as a whole). Nominal Mexico and U.S. wages are in terms of current U.S. dollars. Table 5 for more details on the age and education definitions for the cohorts. 
